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Re-evaluation of the 1995 Hanford Large-Scale 
Drum Fire Test Results
A large-scale drum performance test was conducted at the Hanford Site in June 1995, in which 
over one hundred (100) 55-gal drums in each of two storage configurations were subjected to 
severe fuel pool fires.  The two storage configurations in the test were pallet storage and rack 
storage.  The description and results of the large-scale drum test at the Hanford Site were 
reported in WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246, “Solid Waste Drum Array Fire Performance,” Rev. 0, 
1995.  This was one of the main references used to develop the analytical methodology to predict 
drum failures in WHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501, “Fire Protection Guide for Waste Drum Storage 
Array,” September 1996.  
Three drum failure modes were observed from the test reported in WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246.  
They consisted of seal failure, lid warping, and catastrophic lid ejection.  There was no 
discernible failure criterion that distinguished one failure mode from another.  Hence, all three 
failure modes were treated equally for the purpose of determining the number of failed drums.  
General observations from the results of the test are as follows:
· Trash expulsion was negligible.
· Flame impingement was identified as the main cause for failure.  
· The range of drum temperatures at failure was 600°C to 800°C.  This is above the yield 
strength temperature for steel, approximately 540°C (1,000°F).
· The critical heat flux required for failure is above 45 kW/m2. 
· Fire propagation from one drum to the next was not observed.
The statistical evaluation of the test results using, for example, the student’s t-distribution, will 
demonstrate that the failure criteria for TRU waste drums currently employed at nuclear facilities 
are very conservative relative to the large-scale test results.  Hence, the safety analysis utilizing 
the general criteria described in the five bullets above will lead to a technically robust and 
defensible product that bounds the potential consequences from postulated fires in TRU waste 
facilities, the means of storage in which are the Type A, 55-gal drums. 
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1.0 Introduction
A large-scale drum performance test was conducted at the Hanford Site in June 1995, in which 
over one hundred (100) 55-gal drums in each of two storage configurations were subjected to 
severe fuel pool fires.  The two storage configurations in the test were pallet storage and rack 
storage.  The description and results of the large-scale drum test at the Hanford Site were 
reported in WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246, “Solid Waste Drum Array Fire Performance,” Rev. 0, 1995
(Reference 1).  
Three drum failure modes were observed from the test reported in WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246.  
They consisted of seal failure, lid warping, and catastrophic lid ejection.  There was no 
discernible failure criterion that distinguished one failure mode from another.  In addition, there 
was no discernible correlation in the failure data among the location, heat flux, temperature, and 
pressure.  
A statistical analysis on the failure data was not performed in WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246.  Hence, 
the failure data in WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246 are re-examined in this paper to determine the degree 
of conservatism associated with the safety analysis commonly performed on TRU waste storage 
facilities in DOE/EM.  Re-examination of the data in WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246 is mainly focused 
on the pallet storage configuration, which is the predominant storage configuration in the 
DOE/EM complex.  In particular, a statistical analysis, based on the Student’s t-distribution, is 
performed to estimate the conservative failure criteria for the heat flux and the temperature when 
subjected to a severe fuel pool fire.
2.0 The Hanford large-scale drum fire test
A large-scale drum performance test was conducted at the Hanford Site in June 1995, in which 
more than one hundred (100) 55-gal drums in each of two storage configurations were subjected 
to severe fuel pool fires.  The two storage configurations in the test were pallet storage and rack 
storage.  This test was a continuation in a series of tests, which were small scale and involved 
only a few drums, performed at SNL, LLNL, and INEEL.  The summary of these tests is 
provided in Appendix A to WHC-SD-WM-TRP-233, “Analytical and Experimental Evaluation 
of Solid Waste Drum Array Fire Performance,” Rev. 0, 1995.
The description and results of the large-scale drum test at the Hanford Site were reported in 
WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246, “Solid Waste Drum Array Fire Performance,” Rev. 0, 1995 
(Reference 1).  This was one of the main references used to develop the analytical methodology 
to predict drum failures in WHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501, “Fire Protection Guide for Waste Drum 
Storage Array,” September 1996.  The analytical approach in WHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501 is in 
turn used to perform the accident analysis involving TRU waste drums in the DOE/EM complex.
Three drum failure modes were observed from the test reported in WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246.  
They consisted of seal failure, lid warping, and catastrophic lid ejection.  There was no 
discernible failure criterion that distinguished one failure mode from another.  Hence, all three 
failure modes were treated equally for the purpose of determining the number of failed drums.  
General observations from the results of the test are as follows:
· Trash expulsion was negligible.
· Flame impingement was identified as the main cause for failure.  
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· The range of drum temperatures at failure was 600°C to 800°C.  
· The critical heat flux required for failure is above 45 kW/m2. 
· Fire propagation from one drum to the next was not observed.
A complete set of the measured data from the large-scale fire tests for rack storage and pallet 
storage configurations is excerpted and summarized in Table 1 at the end of the document.  The 
test results for the two drum storage configurations are summarized below.
2.1 Pallet storage test
Of the twenty-two failed drums that failed in one of the three failure modes, only seven drums 
were instrumented and yielded the failure flux data.  For those seven drums, the measured 
radiant heat flux at failure ranged from 77 kW/m2 to 200 kW/m2.  The measured temperature at 
failure ranged from 526°C to 951°C.  Observations and recommendations for the pallet storage 
test in Reference 1 are as follows:
· A total of 135 liters (36 gal) of diesel was used that was spread over an area of 9.3 m2.  In 
addition, 9.5 gal of gasoline was added to ensure even combustion.
· 144 drums on pallets, four drums on a pallet, were stacked three-level high.  
· The magnitude of the fire was 14.5 MW lasting approximately 5 minutes.  
· Of the 144 drums, there were 24 drums directly inside the fuel pool as shown in Figure 1.  
Fourteen of the twenty-four (24) drums engulfed in the fuel pool fire failed. 
· The total number of failed drums, including those with failed seals, was twenty-two (22) as 
shown in Tables 9 and 11 of WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246.  This represents a 15% (22/144) 
failure rate.
· Only three drums, two in the fuel pool fire at the bottom two tiers and one adjacent to the fire 
at the bottom tier, failed by lid ejection.  Of the remaining nineteen (19) failed drums, seal 
failure occurred in eleven drums (50% of the total failure).
Seven of the twenty-two failed drums in the pallet storage configuration were located outside the 
fuel pool fire.  For the two failed drums with low measured temperatures at failure below 600°C, 
failure occurred well after the fuel pool fire was extinguished.  Failure times were 363 seconds 
and 763 seconds at 538°C and 526°C for O831 and O743, respectively.  The measured 
temperature and pressure for the failed drums on pallets are graphically shown in Figure 2. A 
histogram of the failure temperature data is shown in Figure 3.
2.2 Rack storage test
The total failure rate in the rack storage test is higher because of the increased fire severity. The 
magnitudes of the rack storage test fire is 25.6 MW, higher than 14.5 MW in the pallet storage 
test.  The measured temperature at failure ranged from 339°C to 760°C.  For the seven drums, 
the measured radiant heat flux at failure ranged from 64 kW/m2 to 165 kW/m2.  Observations in 
Reference 1 are as follows:
· A total of 265 liters (70 gal) of diesel was spread over an area of 16.6 m2.  In addition, 5 gal 
of gasoline was added to ensure even combustion.
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Figure 1. Pallet storage array fire test (Figure 6, Reference 1).
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Figure 2. Pallet storage array fire test data.
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· The magnitude of the fire was 25.9 MW lasting approximately 5 minutes.  
· 144 drums in racks were arranged in six levels high.  
· The text in Section 8.2.1 and Section 8.2.2, consistent with those in Figure 58 and Table 12, 
in WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246 states that a total of 37 drums failed.  The number of failures also 
includes those due to seal failures.  The resultant failure rate is 26% (37/144).
· 48 drums of the 144 drums were directly in the fuel pool fire, of which 35 drums failed.  
Six instrumented drums in the rack storage configuration located outside the fuel pool did not 
fail.  Of those, four instrumented drums—X251, X253, X254, and X352—located outside the 
fuel pool fire provided the heat flux data.  The measured heat flux ranged from 23 kW/m2 to 
37 kW/m2.  The data associated with these drums that did not fail can provide additional 
assurance that the selected failure criterion for the heat flux is reasonable. Also, it appears that 
data for few of the failed drums are not provided in Reference 1.  
The increased number of 37 failures in the rack storage test may be due to the increased 
magnitude of the fire.  For both pallet and rack storage tests, the predicted failure rates prior to 
the tests were higher, at 48/144 and 45/144, respectively, than the test data as shown in Table 12 
in Reference 1.  While the fraction of failed drums engulfed in the fuel pool fire is higher at 64% 
(46/72), flooding a nuclear facility with gasoline or diesel is not credible.  It would take a total of 
410 gal of gasoline to flood a 40-ft´40-ft compartment to sustain a fire for 140 seconds. Hence, 
the failure rate of engulfed drums alone, which is higher, is not likely to be relevant for 
evaluating accident conditions in a TRU waste storage facility.
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Figure 3. Distribution of the number of failed drums at measured temperature with an interval of 
50˚C from the pallet storage data.
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3.0 Analysis using Student’s t-distribution
A statistical distribution published by William Gosset in 1908.  His employer, Guinness 
Breweries, required him to publish under a pseudonym, so he chose “Student.”  Given N
independent measurements ix , let
N
stx
N
s
xt ±=Þ-º mm (1)
where m is the population mean, x is the sample mean, and s is the estimator for the unknown 
population standard deviation, s, or simply the sample standard deviation.  The sample standard 
deviation is calculated from the sample variance, as follows: 
( )å
=
-
-
=
N
i
i xxN
s
1
22
1
1 (2)
The Student’s t-distribution is defined as the distribution of the random variable t that is (very 
loosely) the “best” estimate without knowing s.  The Student’s t-distribution assumes that the 
general population, from which the sample is drawn, is normally distributed.  Based on 
Equation 1, the upper and lower limits of the true population mean, m, can be estimated as 
follows:
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N
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The standard error of the mean of a sample from a population is the standard deviation of the 
sampling distribution of the mean, and may be estimated by the formula:
N
sSE =
where s is an estimate of the standard deviation, σ, of the population. N is the sample size.  
Using data in Table 1, the sample mean, the sample variance, and the sample standard deviation 
of the temperature at failure, x , s2, and s, are 793.6˚C, 16,054, and 126.7˚C, respectively.  The 
standard error of the sample mean, SE, is 27.01.  Results of the statistical analysis for the pallet 
storage test are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Statistical analysis results of the measured drum temperature at failure based on the 
Student’s t-distribution.
Drum No. Temperature at 
failure, °C
Radiant heat flux at 
failure, kW/m2
( )2xxi -
1 O831 538 85 65350 2070
2 O813 951 NM 24763 NC
3 O812 851 NM 3291 NC
4 O811 857 NM 4015 NC
5 O743 526 NM 71629 NC
6 O742 778 NM 244.5 NC
7 O741 600 NM 37495 NC
8 O723 759 NM 1200 NC
9 O722 932 NM 19144 NC
10 O721 744 NM 2464 NC
11 O713 908 NM 13079 NC
12 O711 732 NM 3799 NC
13 O641 699 77 8956 2862
14 O633 891 81 9480 2450
15 O632 876 135 6784 20.25
16 O631 803 166 87.68 1260
17 O612 937 NM 20553 NC
18 O611 731 NM 3923 NC
19 O541 698 NM 9146 NC
20 O533 920 124 15968 42.25
21 O532 918 176 15466 2070
22 O521 811 200 301.5 4830
sample mean, x 793.6 130.5
sample size, N 22 8
sample variance, s2 16054 2229
sample standard deviation, s 126.7 47.22
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From Appendix D in Reference 4, the value of t for a sample size of 22, i.e., the degree of 
freedom of 21, with the 95% confidence level is 2.08.  The estimate of the lower limit of the 
population mean, m, of the temperature is then:
5.73708.2
22
7.1266.793 =´-=-=-³ tSx
N
stx Em
Similarly, the value of t for a sample size of 8 and the estimate of the lower limit of the mean 
heat flux at failure at the 99% confidence level are 3.499 and 72.08 kW/m2, respectively.  Results 
of the statistical analysis for the measured temperature and heat flux data at failure for the two 
storage configurations at 95% and 99% confidence intervals are summarized in Tables 3 and 4, 
respectively.
Table 3. Statistical analysis results of the measured drum temperature at failure based on the 
Student’s t-distribution.
Sample 
mean
Standard error 
of the mean Sample size
Lower limit of the 
mean at 95% CL
Lower limit of the 
mean at 99% CL
Pallet storage 793.6 27.01 22 737.5 717.2
Rack storage 588.2 30.02 17 524.5 500.5
Combined 704.1 25.81 39 651.8 634.1
Table 4. Statistical analysis results of the measured heat flux at failure based on the Student’s 
t-distribution.
Sample 
mean
Standard error 
of the mean Sample size
Lower limit of the 
mean at 95% CL
Lower limit of the 
mean at 99% CL
Pallet storage 130.5 16.69 8 91.03 72.08
Rack storage 101.8 10.67 11 78.05 68.02
Combined 113.9 9.662 19 93.59 86.08
4.0 Results and discussion
The adiabatic flame temperature from complete combustion of a stoichiometric air-octane 
mixture under ideal conditions was computed using Cheetah 2.0 (Reference 8) to confirm the 
experimental observation that flame impingement is the main cause for drum failure.  Gasoline is 
octane with oxygenate or additives to reduce pollution.  For simplicity, combustion of a 
stoichiometric octane-air mixture is shown below:
The computed adiabatic flame temperature is 2,238°K (1,965°C, Reference 2).  A fuel pool fire 
would be rich in fuel, as evidenced by black smoke in most fuel pool fires, leading to a lower 
flame temperature.  For example, an equivalence ratio of 2, i.e., twice as much fuel in the 
mixture as that in the stoichiometric mixture, yielded an adiabatic flame temperature of 1,512°K 
222
2
2
188 N47OH9CO8N3.76
O
12.5HC ++Þú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+
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(1,238°C). Even for a rich mixture, computed flame temperatures would indicate a significant 
thermal stress on the structural integrity of drums and appear to confirm that flame impingement 
is the main cause of the drum failure.  
Figure 3-11.11 in Reference 3 shows a decreasing trend of the average emissive power with 
increasing diameters of fuel pool fires in open air.  Data in Table 3-11.4 in Reference 3 show a 
wide range of measured emissive powers from 10 kW/m2 for smoky fires to 280 kW/m2.  The 
average flame emissive power, flq& ¢¢ , is computed using the equation below (Reference 3):
{ } { }( )eqeqfl DDq ´--´+´-´=¢¢ 12.0exp12012.0exp140&
The equivalent diameter of the 100-ft2 diesel fuel pool is 3.44 m. The calculated flame emissive 
power of the fire in the large-scale fire test is 99 kW/m2, consistent with the calculated results in 
Reference 1. The flame emissive power also appears to confirm that flame impingement is the 
main cause for failure.  
4.1 Analysis of the combined test data
The sample size of the failed drums is relatively small even in the large scale fire test.  There is 
also uncertainty associated with the assumed distribution of the failure data as presented in 
Figure 3 for the pallet storage configuration alone.  It is therefore prudent to examine the 
combined failure data to derive the failure criteria for drums when subjected to a severe fuel pool 
fire. It is also prudent to use the 99% confidence level results because even the combined sample 
size is relatively small. The combined failure data are shown in Figure 4.  Histograms of the heat 
flux and temperature at failure are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 at the end of the document, 
respectively.
The lower estimate of the heat flux at failure for a large population of drums on pallet when 
subjected to a severe fire is above 72 kW/m2 with the 99% confidence level.  In comparison, the 
lower estimate of the heat flux at failure for a large population of drums when subjected to a 
severe fire is above 68 kW/m2 with the 99% confidence level for the rack storage. Both are 
clearly above 45 kW/m2, commonly used as the failure criterion in the DOE/EM complex, as 
observed in Reference 1.  
Because the magnitude of the fire in the rack storage test is greater than that of the pallet storage 
test, the difference in the mean values at failure may be statistically significant.  To confirm this 
hypothesis, mean values of the heat flux and temperature at failure from the two storage 
configurations in the large-scale fire are tested.  First, the heat flux data are tested from the two 
storage configurations, as follows:
81.19
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229,2
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=+=+=- N
s
N
ss xx
Second, the Z value for the two tailed test is calculated to determine whether the difference in the 
two means is significant, as follows:
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The result indicates that the difference between the two mean values is due to chance at a level of 
significance of 0.05 (t∞ = ±1.96 from Appendix D in Reference 4) and 0.01 (t∞ = ±2.576).  Stated 
otherwise, the difference in the mean heat flux at failure is not sensitive to the storage 
configuration and the magnitude of the fire.  Further, based on the statistical analysis, a better 
estimate of the conservative heat flux criterion for failure of TRU waste drums when subjected to 
a severe fire is 68 kW/m2 with the 99% confidence level.  This is above 45 kW/m2 as observed in 
Reference 1.
As mentioned previously, there were four drums in the rack storage test—X251, X253, X254, 
and X352—located outside the fuel pool fire with measured heat flux data that did not fail.  The 
measured heat flux ranged from 23 kW/m2 to 37 kW/m2.  The data associated with these drums 
that did not fail provide additional assurance that the selected failure criterion for the heat flux is 
reasonable.
For the pallet storage configuration alone, the lower estimate of the temperature at failure for a 
large population of drums when subjected to a severe 14.5-MW fuel pool fire is above 717˚C 
with the 99% confidence level.  This is clearly well within the failure temperature range of 
600˚C to 800˚C stated in Reference 1.  
For the rack storage configuration alone, however, the lower estimate of the temperature at 
failure for a large population of drums when subjected to a severe 25.9-MW fuel pool fire is 
above 500˚C with the 99% confidence level.  This is out of the failure temperature range 
discussed in Reference 1.  Hence, the difference in mean values may be statistically significant.
Figure 4. Combined pallet storage and rack storage fire test data.
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To test the hypothesis on the failure temperature, mean values from the two tests are tested:
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Again, the Z value for the two tailed test is calculated to determine whether the difference in the 
two means is statistically significant, as follows:
96.1576.2088.5
38.40
2.5886.793
>³=
-
=Z
The calculated value of Z is greater than 1.96 and 2.576, which indicates that the difference 
between the two mean values is statistically significant at a level of significance of 0.05 
(t∞ = ±1.96) and 0.01 (t∞ = ±2.576).  The test data do not allow a separate analysis to distinguish 
the effect of the magnitude of the test fire and the effect of the storage configuration.  It is 
inferred that the temperature at failure is sensitive to the magnitude of the fire and, to a lesser 
extent, the storage configuration.  
4.2 Effect of steel pallet
Little known or analyzed in the large scale drum fire test is the effect of the steel pallet on the 
drum failure in a fuel pool fire.  One third of the drums in the pallet storage test was stored on 
steel pallets.  These were on Rows 4 and 5.  Of the 48 drums stored on steel pallets, only four 
drums failed:  O521, O532, O533, and O541.  Of the 48 drums stored on wooden pallets outside 
the fuel pool, only four drums failed:  O831, O813, O812, and O811.  The results are not 
statistically significant to be conclusive.  
Although the benefit of the steel pallet is not apparent from the large scale test data, it is 
generally a good practice to maintain the combustible loading in TRU waste storage facilities at 
a low level.  This is consistent with the recommendation in Section 8.2.2 in Reference 1.
5.0 Conclusion and recommendations
The sample size of the failed drums is relatively small even in the large scale fire test.  
Consequently, there is uncertainty associated with the assumed distribution of the failure data.  
As a result, it is prudent to establish conservative failure criteria for TRU waste storage.  For 
added assurance, the failure criteria with a 99% confidence interval are recommended and used.  
In general, recommended failure criteria derived from on the statistical analysis compare 
favorably with the observations and recommendations in Reference 1.  They are discussed as 
follows:
· Trash expulsion was negligible.
· Flame impingement is the main cause for failure.  
The calculated flame emissive power of the fire in the large-scale fire test is 99 kW/m2.  The 
calculated adiabatic flame temperature for octane (a substantial constituent of gasoline) with 
an equivalence ratio of 2, i.e., twice as much fuel in the mixture as that in the stoichiometric 
mixture, is 1,512°K (1,238°C).  The calculated adiabatic flame temperature and the flame 
emissive power appear to confirm that flame impingement is the main cause for failure.  
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· The range of drum temperatures at failure was 600°C to 800°C.  
The test data do not allow a separate analysis to distinguish the effect of the magnitude of the 
test fire and the effect of the storage configuration.  It is inferred from the analysis that the 
temperature at failure is sensitive to the magnitude of the fire and, to a lesser extent, the 
storage configuration.  For TRU waste drums on pallets subjected to a severe fire with a 
magnitude equal to or less than 14.5 MW, the recommended failure criterion is 700˚C.  When 
subjected to a severe fire greater than 14.5 MW, the recommended failure criterion is 500˚C.
· The critical heat flux required for failure was above 45 kW/m2. 
The heat flux at failure is not sensitive to the storage configuration and the magnitude of the 
fire.  For predicting failures from exposure fires, the commonly used threshold radiant heat 
flux of 45 kW/m2 appears to be low relative to the test data.  Based on the analysis, a better 
estimate of the failure criterion is 68 kW/m2.  
· The failure rate for drums on pallets was 15%.
The total number of failed drums on pallets, including those with failed seals, was 
twenty-two (22) as shown in Tables 9 and 11 in WHC-SD-WM-TRP-246 (Reference 1).  The 
failure rate includes seal failures, which constitute 50% of the failed drums on pallets.  Seal 
failures of drums would not result in a significant release.  The total failure rate 
conservatively rounded up to 20% represents a bounding estimate of the drum failure in the 
source term calculation.  
Application of the recommended criteria for the heat flux and the temperature in an exposure 
fire, those not engulfed in a fuel pool fire as in Figure 1, will yield an extremely conservative 
source term.  Those in a fuel pool fire, application of the recommended criteria will yield a 
conservative source term. Hence, the recommended failure criteria will lead to a technically 
robust and defensible safety analysis that bounds the potential consequences from postulated 
fires in TRU waste storage facilities involving the Type A, 55-gal drums.
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Figure 5. Distribution of the number of failed drums at the measured heat flux with an interval of 
10 kW/m2 from the combined data.
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Figure 6. Distribution of the number of failed drums at the measured temperature with an 
interval of 50˚C from the combined data.
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Table 1. Measured drum failure data from the combined rack storage configuration and pallet 
storage configuration tests.
Drum No. Lid Loss or Rupture Time, s Temperature, ˚C
Pressure, 
psig
Heat flux, 
kW/m2
Out of/In 
Flame
Table 
No.†
1 O521 LID LOSS 203 811 12.8 200 Out 11
2 O532 VENT 212 918 11.4 176 Out 11
3 O533 VENT 254 920 11.6 124 Out 11
4 O541 VENT 292 698 6.9 NM* Out 11
5 O611 LID RUPTURE 165 731 14.5 NM In 9
6 O612 VENT 172 937 9.5 NM In 9
7 O631 LID LOSS 147 803 16.4 166 In 9
8 O632 LID RUPTURE 156 876 17.3 135 In 9
9 O633 LID RUPTURE 245 891 9.7 81 In 9
10 O641 LID RUPTURE 197 699 8.9 77 In 9
11 O711 LID RUPTURE 159 732 14.0 NM In 9
12 O713 VENT 154 908 15.4 NM In 9
13 O721 VENT 160 744 12.0 NM In 9
14 O722 VENT 169 932 16.4 NM In 9
15 O723 LID RUPTURE 185 759 11.6 NM In 9
16 O741 VENT 195 600 3.1 NM In 9
17 O742 VENT 518 778 8.6 NM In 9
18 O743 VENT 763 526 6.4 NM In 9
19 O811 LID RUPTURE 156 857 11.3 NM Out 11
20 O812 LID RUPTURE 152 851 17.4 NM Out 11
21 O813 LID RUPTURE 175 951 14.6 NM Out 11
22 O831 VENT 363 538 5.8 85 Out 11
23 X122 VENT 207 574 3.0 68 Out 8
24 X123 VENT 296 528 2.7 64 Out 8
25 X125 VENT 362 507 2.4 NM Out 8
26 X131 VENT 166 592 5.2 95 Out 8
27 X211 LID RUPTURE 112 680 12.4 NM In 6
28 X213 LID LOSS 119 427 11.0 NM In 6
29 X214 LID LOSS 163 483 11.0 NM In 6
30 X222 LID LOSS 98 760 16.5 142 In 6
31 X224 LID RUPTURE 211 592 7.1 75 In 6
32 X225 LID RUPTURE 236 686 7.8 88 In 6
33 X226 LID RUPTURE 275 699 6.7 109 In 6
34 X231 LID LOSS 162 693 8.7 165 In 6
35 X233 LID LOSS 273 627 7.5 147 In 6
36 X256 VENT 298 339 3.8 NM Out 8
37 X312 LID RUPTURE 110 701 11.0 NM In 6
38 X321 LID RUPTURE 122 711 10.0 101 In 6
39 X332 LID LOSS 249 400 8.4 66 In 6
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x 704.1 113.9
s2 25975 1,774
s 161.2 42.12
Sample size 39 19
t (0.025)** 2.025 2.101
t (0.01) 2.713 2.878
Lower limit of the mean at 95% CL 651.8 93.59
Lower limit of the mean at 99% CL 634.1 86.08
† From Reference 1
*  Not measured
**  From Reference 4
